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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RONALD W. HARDY, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
JEAN HARDY [GWIRTZ], 
Respondent/Appellee 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
Court of Appeals No. 20040812 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-
3(2)(h)(2004). 
This is an appeal from a trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for Appellee to 
be found in contempt of court in a parent time dispute. Appellee granted parent time to 
Appellant in accordance with the parent time schedule that was in effect at the time that 
Appellant's parent time rights were last defined by the Court. Although there was a 
subsequent change in the statutory parent time schedule that granted the noncustodial an 
extra day and a half of parent time for President's Day in even-numbered years, Appellee 
was neither aware of that change nor aware that a subsequent change in statute could or 
would affect her case. She neither offered parent time for the additional day and a half 
nor denied any request for that additional time. The trial court found that Appellee's 
omission did not constitute contempt of court because the omission was not willful 
disobedience of a court order. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Are the Court's Conclusions of Law clearly erroneous? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's conclusions 
of law under a correction of error standard. Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 68 
P.3d 1015, 1017 (Utah App. 2003); Bailey v. Call, 161 P.2d 138, 139-140- (Utah App. 
1989). This standard mandates that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions 
of the trial court. Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d. 1119 (Utah 2002). 
Issue No. 2: Did the Court err in not holding Appellee in contempt for failing to 
be aware of the governing visitation statute even where the same denies statutory 
visitation to the noncustodial parent? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's conclusions 
of law under a correction of error standard. Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 68 
P.3d 1015, 1017 (Utah App. 2003); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 139-140- (Utah App. 
1989). This standard mandates that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions 
of the trial court. Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d. 1119 (Utah 2002). 
Issue No. 3: Should parents in divorce situations subject to visitation have a duty 
to know and to obey the latest version of the visitation statute - and should the Court 
express a duty in Ibis regard? 
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Standard of Review: This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's conclusions 
of law under a correction of error standard. Groberg v. Housing Opportunities, Inc., 68 
P.3d 1015, 1017 (Utah App. 2003); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138,139-140- (Utah App. 
1989). This standard mandates that this Court give no deference to the legal conclusions 
of the trial court. Roderick v. Ricks, 54 P.3d. 1119 (Utah 2002). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions is applicable to this case: 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 18 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1(5) 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter, on appeal, directly challenges case law holding that knowledge of the 
requirements of a court order must be proven by clear and convincing evidence in a civil 
contempt proceeding. That case law may be found at Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 
1162 (Utah 1988); Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass 'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988). 
Appellant challenges the trial court's conclusion of law that Appellee could not be 
found in contempt of court because her action was not "willful." While admitting that 
Appellee did not know that the visitation statute had been expanded to give noncustodial 
parents an additional day and a half for President's Day in even-numbered years, 
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Appellant implicitly argues that simple "noncompliance/' without finding the elements of 
knowledge or intent is sufficient for a finding of contempt or, in the alternative, the 
standard for knowledge should be subjectively applied so that Appellee could be found in 
contempt if she should have known even if she did not actually know and even if she had 
no intent to disobey a court order. In addition, Appellant appears to argue that the 
subjective standard should be retroactively applied to Appellee so that she may be found 
in contempt for the visitation for Presidents Day 2002. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
POINT I 
Existing case law, requiring a finding that Appellee "willfully" violated an order 
of the court, and the trial court's finding that Appellee relied upon an old version of the 
visitation statute and complied with that version, left the trial court no choice but to find 
that this party did not commit contempt of court. A finding of "willful" action requires 
the Court to find that Appellee knew that a court order required different conduct and 
deliberately violated that order. In the case at hand, the parties agreed that Appellee did 
not know that a court order required different conduct. Therefore, the Court correctly 
applied the law to this case and reached the correct conclusion. 
POINT II 
The Court could not have found Appellee in contempt of court for failing to be 
aware of a change in law because the Court had not ordered her to be aware of changes in 
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the law. At Utah Code Ann. 78-32-1, the law very clearly sets forth twelve (12) acts and 
omissions that constitute contempt. Failing to know about changes in the law is nowhere 
in the list of such acts and omissions. Even Appellant admits that no Utah statute or case 
law or rule of law imposes such a duty upon custodial parents. Therefore, the Court 
correctly held that Appellee did not willfully violate a court order. 
POINT III 
Appellant argues for new law, law not currently existing or supported by any 
statute or appellate court, imposing upon Appellee a duty that has not previously existed 
and finding her in contempt of court for breaching that duty. This Court should resist 
this pressure, as any such duty could not be imposed upon Appellee without violating the 
constitutional prohibition on ex post facto law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW WAS NOT 
ERRONEOUS 
The trial court correctly found that Appellee could not be found in contempt of 
court if she did not knowingly, willfully violate an order of the court. In order to prove 
contempt for failure to comply with a court order it must be shown that the party cited for 
contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and willfully and 
knowingly refused to comply". Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass 'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 
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1070, (Utah 1988); see also. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). These 
elements must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Von Hake, Mil. 
Appellant implicitly attacks two of the two of the three elements of contempt - the 
element of knowledge and the element of intent. The element of knowledge, a 
requirement that the person cited for contempt knew what was required, is particularly 
important in this case because Appellee lacked two different types of "knowledge." 
First, Appellee did not know that subsequent changes in the law changed her rights 
and obligations under the existing visitation order. Nothing in any court order informed 
her that such changes could happen without returning to court, no law states that changes 
in the visitation statute apply to existing court orders, and no case law addresses the issue 
of whether or not a statutory change requires a petition for modification or if the statute 
invisibly and quietly modifies substantive provisions of existing orders without the 
knowledge of either party. This question has been debated in multiple courts in the 
context of petitions for modification and would be an interesting question on a law school 
exam. Interesting and persuasive arguments can be made for both sides of the debate. 
Appellee should not be faulted for not knowing the answer. 
Second, Appellee did not know that the visitation statute had been changed to 
grant noncustodial parents an additional day and a half of visitation for President's Day in 
even-numbered years. Utah Code Ann. 30-3-35 (2004). Appellant does not deny that he 
did not know either and evidence presented at hearing indicates that Appellant did not 
inform Appellee or request the additional time with his daughter. Instead, Appellant 
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cites reasons why he believes that Appellee should have known, but does not deny that 
she did not know. For a finding of contempt, however, the burden is upon Appellant to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Appellee actually knew. Appellant failed to 
carry that burden and the Court had no choice but to find that there was no contempt of 
court. 
Appellant explicitly attacks the requirement for a finding as to the element of 
intent. Contempt of court is quasi-criminal in nature and can include civil damages, 
fines and even incarceration. Utah Code Ann. 78-32-10; Utah Code Ann. 78-32-11; 
Utah Code Ann. 78-32-12. Because of the extremely serious nature of the allegation and 
the penalties, it is only appropriate that it requires a finding that the accused "willfully 
and knowingly refused to comply." Utah Farm Prod, Credit Ass fn v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 
1070 (Utah 1988). In attacking the requirement as to intent, it is unclear if Appellant 
seeks to impose upon custodial parents strict liability for visitation issues or if he wishes 
to create a new, quasi-crime of "negligent contempt" wherein custodial parents may be 
punished without intent for not knowing the law. Either way, Appellant should be 
denied. Strict liability and crimes of neglect should be reserved for circumstances with 
much, much greater potential for devastating and irreparable harm that the simple failure 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
HOLD APPELLEE IN CONTEMPT FOR BEING 
UNAWARE OF THE CURRENT VISITATION 
STATUTE. 
As set forth above, Appellee could not have been found in contempt of court for 
not being aware of the change in the visitation statute because nothing in the law requires 
her to track changes in the law. She not only didn't know that the statute had been 
changed to give him an extra day and a half, but she had no reason to believe that the 
order of the court granting him visitation in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 30-3-35 
meant "as that statute is today and as it may be changed at any time in the future" instead 
of just "as that statute is right now." 
Even if the Court had, for whatever reason, found that Appellee had a duty to track 
changes in the visitation statute, and had violated that duty by not knowing about the 
President's Day holiday, the Court still could not have found Appellee in contempt of 
court without finding both that she knew she had that duty and had willfully failed to 
remain current in the law. Therefore, the Court's decision not to hold Appellee in 
contempt of court was not an error but was entirely supported by the law. 
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POINT III 
SHOULD THE COURT CREATE A DUTY FOR 
PARENTS IN DIVORCE SITUATIONS WITH 
CHILDREN SUBJECT TO VISITATION TO KNOW 
AND TO OBEY THE LATEST VERSION OF THE 
VISITATION STATUTE? 
The answer to Appellant's question lies in the answers to two smaller questions -
(1) Do statutory changes in the visitation statute automatically amend divorce decrees and 
visitation orders without the need for a Petition to Modify or a "substantial change in 
circumstance"? and (2) Which parent bears the burden of this duty and what if both 
parents fail in this duty as in the case at hand? 
Appellee respectfully submits that, while the answer to the first question would 
satisfy counsel's curiosity, it is not a question relevant to the trial court's decision in this 
particular case unless the Court imposes this duty retroactively, finds Appellee in 
contempt of court for violating a duty that had not yet been created, and violates 
Appellee's constitutional right to protection from ex post facto laws. Utah Const. Art. I, 
Sec. 18. Appellant is asking "What should the law be" and not "Did the trial court 
correctly apply the law." Such a question is entertaining but unhelpful in determining if 
Appellee violated the visitation order. 
The second question - which parent should bear the burden of remaining current 
in the law - would also satisfy curiosity but has no practical bearing upon the issues of 
this case. As this duty was not assigned to either Appellee or Appellant, neither 
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breached the duty even though neither parent knew that the visitation statute had 
changed. In this case, Appellee did not "make the child available" for visitation as 
required by Utah Code Ann. 30-3-33(5), but Appellant did not fulfill his duty to pick up 
the child for visitation. The Court could not punish either party for his or her failures or 
omissions because neither violated a court order. Appellee cannot be punished for breach 
of a duty created and assigned after the fact. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appelle respectfully requests that this court uphold the 
decision of the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /? day of ^Of2^ 2005. 
SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
J e n n i f e r P r l ^ e e v ^ — - — 
Attorney for Appellee 
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